Seminario del 2024

Aprile
17
2024
Marco Tolotti
Polarization and Coherence in Mean Field Games Driven by Private and Social Utility
nell'ambito della serie: STOCHASTICS AND APPLICATIONS - 2024
sistemi dinamici
We study a mean field game in continuous time over a finite horizon, T, where the state of each agent is binary and where players base their strategic decisions on two, possibly competing, factors: the willingness to align with the majority (conformism) and the aspiration of sticking with the own type (stubbornness). We also consider a quadratic cost related to the rate at which a change in the state happens: changing opinion may be a costly operation. Depending on the parameters of the model, the game may have more than one Nash equilibrium, even though the corresponding N-player game does not. Moreover, it exhibits a very rich phase diagram, where polarized/unpolarized, coherent/incoherent equilibria may coexist, except for T small, where the equilibrium is always unique. We fully describe such phase diagram in closed form and provide a detailed numerical analysis of the N-player counterpart of the mean field game. Joint work with Paolo Dai Pra (Verona) and Elena Sartori (Padova).
organizzato da: Lorenzo Cerboni-Baiardi
nell'ambito del Progetto R.F.O. RFO2022DIECIR del prof. Roberto Dieci

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